Comments on John C. Harsanyi's paper by Kutschera, Franz
C O M M E N T S O N J O H N C . H A R S A N Y I ' S P A P E R 
Act utilitarianism (AU) and rule utilitarianism (RU) are defined rather 
vaguely and ambiguously in most of the literature. I want to argue that in 
some interpretation of the terms they are indeed equivalent, in others they 
are not. Let us think of a game S played by n persons 1,..., n who have a 
choice between actions f l 9 . . . , / m . On the set X of results n Utility functions 
Ui are to be defined. Then A U cannot be sensibly defined by saying: " A n 
action ƒ is right (in S) if it will maximize social Utility (which for a result x 
is defined by Us(x) = 2 ut(x)y\ For what action will maximize Us depends 
on who is acting and on what the other players do. So we can only say: 
"On condition that p (p being a set of possible outcomes) it is right for i 
to do ƒ iff that is compatible with achieving an optimal /^-result (with re-
spect to Us)." By generalizing over persons i we obtain a concept of 
rightness for actions, and by choosing a tautologous p we get concepts of 
prima facie rightness for acts and actions. 
If we define R U as maintaining 
a) An action ƒ is right if, realized by everyone, it will maximize U89 
then clearly R U and A U (prima facie version for actions) are not equiv-
alent and the cases of non-equivalence are also cases of inadequacy of 
R U , as the following example shows, where f2 is forbidden according to 
R U , but allowed according to A U . 
v k k ' \ 
k 2 5 
k 5 1 
However, if we consider R U as an answer to the question, what general 
practice should be adopted in a society, and formulate its thesis as 
b) A general practice is right if (with respect to other general 
practices) it will maximize Us, 
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then it is equivalent with A U , since according to A U an action ƒ is right 
for anyone, on condition that everybody does fx or . . . or everybody does 
fm iff the result where everybody does ƒ is optimal. And in this sense the 
equivalence thesis seems to have been intended by D. Lyons in 'Forms 
and Limits of Utilitarianism' (1965), for instance. 
Now Professor Harsanyi has formulated A U and R U as principles that 
apply to different situations. According to his definition either what all the 
others do is given - then R U does not apply - or it is not - then A U does 
not apply. But we can compare A U and R U as to their relative merits only 
if there are at least some situations to which both apply. If we understand 
R U as a decision rule under the assumption that all will use the same 
strategy then a comparable form of A U will have to use the same assump-
tion and it is then equivalent with R U , as I have pointed out. Consider 
Harsanyi's Example 1. He says that R U will require all voters to vote, but 
A U will require each voter to vote only if he expects all others to vote. But 
this is only true according to my first version of R U , not according to his 
definition, on which R U only applies under the assumption that either all 
vote or all do not vote. (This is a questionable assumption in a non-
cooperative Situation like voting since it implies that whatever I do, by 
some hidden machinations the others will do, too.) Now, on this same 
assumption A U also teils me to vote for if I do so, according to the 
assumption, the others will vote, too. 
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